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JUSTICE SCALIA'S MISUNDERSTANDING*
Stephen Jay Gould**
Charles Lyell, defending both his version of geology and his
designation of James Hutton as its intellectual father, described
Richard Kirwan as a man "who possessed much greater authority
in the scientific world than he was entitled by his talents to enjoy."
Kirwan, chemist, mineralogist, and president of the Royal
Academy of Dublin, did not incur Lyell's wrath for a mere scientific
disagreement, but for saddling Hutton with the most serious indictment of all-atheism and impiety. Kirwan based his accusations on
the unlikely charge that Hutton had placed the earth's origin beyond the domain of what science could consider or (in a stronger
claim) had even denied that a point of origin could be inferred at all.
Kirwan wrote in 1799:
Recent experience has shown that the obscurity in which the philosophical knowl·
edge of this [original] state has hitherto been involved, has proved too favorable to
the structure of various systems of atheism or infidelity, as these have been in their
turn to turbulence and immorality, not to endeavor to dispel it by all the lights
which modern geological researches have struck out. Thus it will be found that
geology naturally ripens ... into religion, as this does into morality.

In our more secular age, we may fail to grasp the incendiary
character of such a charge at the end of the eighteenth century,
when intellectual respectability in Britain absolutely demanded an
affirmation of religious fealty, and when fear of spreading revolution
from France and America equated any departure from orthodoxy
with encouragement of social anarchy. Calling someone an atheist
in those best and worst of all times invited the same predictable
reaction as asking Cyrano how many sparrows had perched up
there or standing up in a Boston bar and announcing that DiMaggio was a better hitter than Williams.
Thus, Hutton's champions leaped to his defense, first his contemporary and Boswell, John Playfair, who wrote (in 1802) that
such poisoned weapons as he [Kirwan] was preparing to use, are hardly ever allowable in scientific contest, as having a less direct tendency to overthrow the system,
With permission from Natural History, Vol. 96, No. 10. Copyright the American
Museum of Natural History, 1987.
•• Professor of Geology, Harvard University.
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than to hurt the person of an adversary, and to wound, perhaps incurably, his mind,
his reputation, or his peace.

Thirty years later, Charles Lyell was still fuming:
We cannot estimate the malevolence of such a persecution, by the pain which similar insinuations might now inflict; for although charges of infidelity and atheism
must always be odious, they were injurious in the extreme at that moment of political excitement [Principles of Geology, 1830].

(Indeed, Kirwan noted that his book had been ready for the
printers in 1798 but had been delayed for a year by "the confusion
arising from the rebellion then raging in Ireland"-the great Irish
peasant revolt of 1798, squelched by Viscount Castlereagh, uncle of
Darwin's Captain FitzRoy.)
Kirwan's accusation centered upon the last sentence of Hutton's Theory of the Earth (original version of 1788)-the most famous words ever written by a geologist (quoted in all textbooks, and
often emblazoned on the coffee mugs and T -shirts of my
colleagues).
The result, therefore, of our present enquiry is, that we find no vestige of a beginning-no prospect of an end.

Kirwan interpreted both this motto, and Hutton's entire argument, as a claim for the earth's eternity (or at least as a statement of
necessary agnosticism about the nature of its origin). But if the
earth be eternal, then God did not make it. And if we need no God
to fashion our planet, then do we need him at all? Even the weaker
version of Hutton as agnostic about the earth's origin supported a
charge of atheism in Kirwan's view-for if we cannot know that
God made the earth at a certain time, then biblical authority is dethroned, and we must wallow in uncertainty about the one matter
that demands our total confidence.
It is, I suppose, a testimony to human carelessness and to our
tendency to substitute quips for analysis that so many key phrases,
the mottoes of our social mythology, have standard interpretations
quite contrary to their intended meanings. Kirwan's reading has
prevailed. Most geologists still think that Hutton was advocating
an earth of unlimited duration-though we now view such a claim
as heroic rather than impious.
Yet Kirwan's charge was more than merely vicious-it was
dead wrong. Moreover, in understanding why Kirwan erred (and
why we still do), and in recovering what Hutton really meant, we
illustrate perhaps the most important principle that we can state
about science as a way of knowing. Our failure to grasp the principle underlies much public misperception about science. In particu-
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lar, Justice Scalia's recent dissent in the Louisiana "creation
science" case rests upon this error when it discusses the character of
evolutionary arguments. We all rejoiced when the Supreme Court
ended a long episode in American history and voided the last law
that would have forced teachers to "balance" instruction in evolution with fundamentalist biblical literalism masquerading under the
oxymoron creation science. I now add a tiny hurrah in postscript
by pointing out that the dissenting argument rests, in large part,
upon a misunderstanding of science.
Hutton replied to Kirwan's original attack by expanding his
1788 treatise into a cumbersome work, The Theory of the Earth
(1795). With its forty-page quotations in French and its repetitive,
involuted justifications, Hutton's new work condemned his theory
to unreadability. Fortunately, his friend John Playfair, a mathematician and outstanding prose stylist, composed the most elegant
pony ever written and published his Illustrations of the Huttonian
Theory of the Earth in 1802. Playfair presents a two-part refutation
for Kirwan's charge of atheism.
1. Hutton neither argued that the earth was eternal nor even
claimed that we could say nothing about its origin. In his greatest
contribution, Hutton tried to develop a cyclical theory for the history of the earth's surface, a notion to match the Newtonian vision
of continuous planetary revolution about the sun. The materials of
the earth's surface, he argued, passed through a cycle of perfect repetition in the large. Consider the three major stages. First, mountains erode and their products are accumulated as thick sequences
of layered sediments in the ocean. Second, sediments consolidate
and their weight melts the lower layers, forming magmas. Third,
the pressure of these magmas forces the sediments up to form new
mountains (with solidified magmas at their core), while the old,
eroded continents become new ocean basins. The cycle then starts
again as mountains (at the site of old oceans) shed their sediments
into ocean basis (at the site of old continents). Land and sea change
positions in an endless dance, but the earth itself remains fundamentally the same. Playfair writes:
It is the peculiar excellence of this theory ... that it makes the decay of one part
subservient to the restoration of another, and gives stability to the whole, not by
perpetuating individuals, but by reproducing them in succession.

We can easily grasp the revolutionary nature of this theory for
concepts of time. Most previous geologies had envisioned an earth
of short duration, moving in a single irreversible direction, as its
original mountains eroded into the sea. By supplying a "concept of
repair" in his view of magmas as uplifing forces, Hutton burst the
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strictures of time. No more did continents erode once into oblivion;
they could form anew from the products of their own decay and the
earth could cycle on and on.
This cyclical theory has engendered the false view that Hutton
considered the earth eternal. True, the mechanics of the cycle provide no insight into beginnings or ends, for laws of the cycle can
only produce a continuous repetition and therefore contain no notion of birth, death, or even of aging. But this conclusion only specifies that laws of the present order of nature cannot specify
beginnings or ends. Beginnings and ends may exist-in fact, Hutton considered a concept of starts and stops absolutely essential for
any rational understanding-but we cannot learn anything about
this vital subject from nature's present laws. Hutton, who was a
devoted theist despite Kirwan's charge, argued that God had made
a beginning, and would ordain an end, by summoning forces outside
the current order of nature. For the stable period between, he had
ordained laws that impart no directionality and therefore permit no
insight into these beginnings and ends.
Note how carefully Hutton chose the words of his celebrated
motto. "No vestige of a beginning" because the earth has been
through so many cycles since then that all traces of its original state
have vanished. But an original state it certainly had. "No prospect
of an end" because the current laws of nature provide no insight
into a termination that must surely occur. Playfair describes Hutton's view of God:
He may put an end, as he no doubt gave a beginning, to the present system, at some
determinate period; but we may safely conclude, that this great catastrophe will not
be brought about by any of the laws now existing, and that it is not indicated by any
thing which we perceive.

2. Hutton did not view our inability to specify beginnings and
ends as a baleful limitation of science but as a powerful affirmation
of proper scientific methodology. Let theory deal with ultimate origins, and let science be the art of the empirically soluble.
The British tradition of speculative geology-from Burnet,
Whiston, and Woodward in the late seventeenth century to Kirwan
himself at the tail end of the eighteenth-had focused upon reconstructions of the earth's origin, primarily to justify the Mosaic narrative as scientifically plausible. Hutton argued that such attempts
could not qualify as proper science, for they could only produce
speculations about a distant past devoid of evidence to test any assertion (no vestige of a beginning). The subject of origins may be
vital and fascinating, far more compelling than the humdrum of
quotidian forces that drive the present cycle of uplift, erosion, depo-
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sition, and consolidation. But science is not speculation about unattainable ultimates; it is a way of knowing based upon laws now in
operation and results subject to observation and inference. We acknowledge limits in order to proceed with power and confidence.
Hutton therefore attacked the old tradition of speculation
about the earth's origin as an exercise in futile unprovability. Better
to focus upon what we can know and test, leaving aside what the
methods of science cannot touch, however fascinating the subject.
Playfair stresses this theme more forcefully (and more often) than
any other in his exposition of Hutton's theory. He regards Hutton's
treatise as, above all, an elegant statement of proper scientific methodology-and he locates Hutton's wisdom primarily in his friend's
decision to eschew the subject of ultimate origins and to focus on
the earth's present operation. Playfair begins by criticizing the old
manner of theorizing:
The sole object of such theories has hitherto been, to explain the manner in which
the present laws of the mineral kingdom were first established, or began to exist,
without treating of the manner in which they now proceed.

He then evaluates this puerile strategy in one of his best prose
flourishes:
The absurdity of such an undertaking admits of no apology; and the smile which it
might excite, if addressed merely to the fancy, gives place to indignation when it
assumes the air of philosophic investigation.

Hutton, on the other hand, established the basis of a proper
geological science by avoiding subjects "altogether beyond the limits of philosophical investigation." Hutton's explorations "never
extended to the first origin of substances, but were confined entirely
to their changes." Playfair elaborated:
He has indeed no where treated of the first origin of any of the earths, or of any
substance whatsoever, but only of the transformations which bodies have undergone
since the present laws of nature were established. He considered this last as all that
a science, built on experiment and observation, can possibly extend to; and willingly
left, to more presumptuous inquirers, the task of carrying their reasonings beyond
the boundaries of nature.

Finally, to Kirwan's charge that Hutton had limited science by
his "evasion" of origins, Playfair responded that his friend had
strengthened science by his positive program of studying what
could be resolved:
Instead of an evasion, therefore, any one who considers the subject fairly, will see, in
Dr. Hutton's reasoning, nothing but the caution of a philosopher, who wisely confines his theory within the same limits by which nature has confined his experience
and observation.
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This all happened a long time ago and in a context foreign to
our concerns. But Hutton's methodological wisdom, and Playfair's
eloquent warning, could not be more relevant today-for basic principles of empirical science do have an underlying generality that can
transcend time. Practicing scientists have largely (but not always)
imbibed Hutton's wisdom about restricting inquiry to questions
that can be answered. But Kirwan's error of equating the best in
science with the biggest questions about ultimate things continues
to be the most common of popular misunderstandings.
I have often mentioned that fifteen years of monthly columns
have brought me an enormous correspondence from nonprofessionals about all aspects of science. From sheer volume, I obtain a
pretty good sense of strengths and weaknesses in public perceptions.
I have found that one common misconception surpasses all others.
People will write, telling me that they have developed a revolutionary theory, one that will expand the boundaries of science. These
theories, usually described in several pages of single-spaced typescript, are speculations about the deepest ultimate questions we can
ask-what is the nature of life? the origin of the universe? the beginning of time?
But thoughts are cheap. Any person of intelligence can devise
his half dozen before breakfast. Scientists can also spin out ideas
about ultimates. We don't (or, rather, we confine them to our private thoughts) because we cannot devise ways to test them, to decide whether they are right or wrong. What good to science is a
lovely idea that cannot, as a matter of principle, ever be affirmed or
denied?
The following homily may seem paradoxical but it embodies
Hutton's wisdom: the best science often proceeds by putting aside
the overarching generality and focusing instead on a smaller question that can be reliably answered. In so doing, scientists show their
intuitive feel for the fruitful, not their narrowness or paltriness of
spirit. In this way we sneak up on big questions that only repel us if
we try to engulf them in one fell speculation. Newton could not
discover the nature of gravity, but he could devise a mathematics
that unified the motion of a carriage with the revolution of the
moon. Darwin never tried to grasp the meaning of life (or even the
manner of its origin on our planet), but he did develop a powerful
theory to explain its manner of change through time. Hutton did
not discover how our earth originated, but he developed some powerful and testable ideas about how it ticked. You might almost define a good scientist as a person with the horse sense to discern the
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largest answerable question-and to shun useless issues that sound
bigger.
Hutton's positive principle of restriction to the doable also defines the domain and procedures of evolutionary biology, my own
discipline. Evolution is not the study of life's ultimate origin as a
path toward discerning its deepest meaning. Evolution, in fact, is
not the study of origins at all. Even the more restricted (and scientifically permissible) question of life's origin on our earth lies
outside its domain. (This interesting problem, I suspect, falls primarily within the purview of chemistry and the physics of self-organizing systems.) Evolution studies the pathways and mechanisms
of organic change following the origin of life. Not exactly a shabby
subject either-what with such resolvable questions as "how, when,
and where did humans evolve?"; how do mass extinction, continental drift, competition among species, climatic change, and inherited
constraints of form and development interact to influence the manner and rate of evolutionary change?"; "how do the branches of
life's tree fit together?" to mention just a few among thousands
equally exciting.
In their recently aborted struggle to inject Genesis literalism
into science classrooms, fundamentalist groups followed their usual
opportunistic strategy of arguing two contradictory sides of a question when a supposed rhetorical advantage could be extracted from
each. Their main pseudoargument held that Genesis literalism is
not religion at all, but really an alternative form of science (creation
science) not acknowledged by professional biologists too hidebound
and dogmatic to appreciate the cutting edge of their own discipline.
When we successfully pointed out that creation science-as an untestable set of dogmatic proposals--could not qualify as science by
any standard definition, they turned around and shamelessly argued
the other side. (They actually pulled off the neater trick of holding
both positions simultaneously.) Now they argued that, yes indeed,
creation science is religion, but evolution is equally religious.
To support this dubious claim, they tumbled (as a conscious
trick of rhetoric, I suspect) right into Kirwan's error. They ignored
what evolutionists actually do and misrepresented our science as the
study of life's ultimate origin. They then pointed out, as Hutton
had, that question of ultimate origins are not resolvable by science.
Thus, they claimed, creation science and evolution science are symmetrical-that is, equally religious. Creation science isn't science
because it rests upon the untestable fashioning of life ex nihilo by
God. Evolution science isn't science because it tries, as its major
aim, to resolve the unresolvable and ultimate origin of life. But we
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do no such thing. We understand Hutton's wisdom-"he has nowhere treated of the first origin ... of any substance ... but only of
the transformations which bodies have undergone .... "
Our legal battle with creationists started in the 1920s and
reached an early climax with the conviction of John Scopes in 1925.
After some quiescence, it began in earnest again during the 1970s
and has haunted us ever since. (I have written more than half a
dozen essays, most in this series, on the resurgence of creation science.) Finally, in June 1987, the Supreme Court ended this major
chapter in American history with a decisive 7-2 vote, striking down
the last creationist statute, the Louisiana equal time act, as a ruse to
inject religion into science classrooms in violation of first amendment guarantees for separation of church and state.
I don't mean to appear ungrateful, but we fallible humans are
always seeking perfection in others. I couldn't help wondering how
two justices could have ruled the other way. I may not be politically astute, but I am not totally naive either. I have read Justice
Scalia's long dissent carefully, and I recognize that its main thrust
lies in legal issues supporting the extreme judicial conservatism espoused by Scalia and the other dissenter, Chief Justice Rehnquist.
Nonetheless, though it may form only part of his rationale, Scalia's
argument relies crucially upon a false concept of science-Kirwan's
error again. I regret to say that Justice Scalia does not understand
the subject matter of evolutionary biology. He has simply adopted
the creationists' definition and thereby repeated their willful
mistake.
Justice Scalia writes, in his key statement on scientific
evidence:
The people of Louisiana, including those who are Christian fundamentalists, are
quite entitled, as a secular matter, to have whatever scientific evidence there may be
against evolution presented in their schools.

I simply don't see the point of this statement. Of course they
are so entitled, and absolutely nothing prevents such a presentation,
if evidence there be. The equal time law forces teaching of creation
science, but nothing prevented it before, and nothing prevents it
now. Teachers were, and still are, free to teach creation science.
They don't because they know that it is a ruse and a sham.
Scalia does acknowledge that the law would be unconstitutional if creation science is free of evidence-as it is-and if it
merely restates the Book of Genesis-as it does:
Perhaps what the Louisiana Legislature has done is unconstitutional because there
is no such evidence, and the scheme they have established will amount to no more
than a presentation of the Book of Genesis.
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Scalia therefore admits that the issue is not merely legal and
does hinge on a question of scientific fact. He then buys the creationist argument and denies that we have sufficient evidence to
render this judgment of unconstitutionality. Continuing directly
from the last statement, he writes:
But we cannot say that on the evidence before us .... Infinitely less can we say (or
should we say) that the scientific evidence for evolution is so conclusive that no one
would be gullible enough to believe that there is any real scientific evidence to the
contrary.

But this is exactly what I, and all scientists, do say. We are not
blessed with absolute certainty about any fact of nature, but evolution is as well confirmed as anything we know-surely as well as
the earth's shape and position (and we don't require equal time for
flat earthers and those who believe that our planet resides at the
center of the universe). We have oodles to learn about how evolution happened, but we have adequate proof that living forms are
connected by bonds of genealogical descent.
So I asked myself, how could Justice Scalia be so uninformed
about the state of our basic knowledge? And then I remembered
something peculiar that bothered me, but did not quite register,
when I first read his dissent. I went back to his characterization of
evolution and what did I find (repeated, by the way, more than a
dozen times, so we know that it represents no one-time slip of his
pen, but a consistent definition).
Justice Scalia has defined evolution as the search for life's origin-and nothing more. He keeps speaking about "the current
state of scientific evidence about the origin of life" when he means
to designate evolution. He writes that "the legislature wanted to
ensure that students would be free to decide for themselves how life
began based upon a fair and balanced presentation of the scientific
evidence." Never does he even hint that evolution might be the
study of how life changes after it originates-the entire panoply of
transformation from simple molecules to all modern, multicellular
complexity.
Moreover, to make matters worse, Scalia doesn't even acknowledge the scientific side of the origin of life on earth. He argues that a creationist law might have a secular purpose so long as
we can envisage a concept of creation not involving a personal God
"who is the object of religious veneration." He then points out that
many such concepts exist, stretching back to Aristotle's notion of
an unmoved mover. In the oral argument before the Court, which I
attended on December 10, 1986, Scalia pressed this point even more
forcefully with counsel for our side. He sparred:
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What about Aristotle's view of a first cause, an unmoved mover? Would that be a
creationist view? I don't think Aristotle considered himself as a theologian as opposed to a philospher.
In fact, he probably considered himself a scientist. ... Well, then, you could
believe in a first cause, an unmoved mover, that may be impersonal, and has no
obligation of obedience or veneration from men, and in fact, doesn't care what's
happening to mankind. And believe in creation. [From the official transcript, and
omitting the responses of our lawyer.]

Following this theme, Scalia presents his most confused statement in the written dissent:
Creation science, its proponents insist, no more must explain whence life came than
evolution must explain whence came the inanimate materials from which it says life
evolved. But even if that were not so, to posit a past creator is not to posit the
eternal and personal God who is the object of religious veneration.

True indeed; one might be a creationist in some vernacular
sense by maintaining a highly abstract and impersonal view of the
creator. But Aristotle's unmoved mover is no more part of science
than the Lord of Genesis. Science does not deal with questions of
ultimate origins. We would object just as strongly if the Aristotelophiles of Delaware forced a law through the state legislature
requiring that creation of each species ex nihilo by an unmoved
mover be presented every time evolution is discussed in class. The
difference is only historical circumstance, not the logic of argument.
The unmoved mover doesn't pack much political punch; fundamentalism ranks among our most potent irrationalisms.
Consider also, indeed especially, Scalia's false concept of science. He equates creation and evolution because creationists can't
explain life's beginning, while evolutionists can't resolve the ultimate origin of the inorganic components that later aggregated to
life. But this inability is the very heart of creationist logic and the
central reason why their doctrine is not science, while science's inability to specify the ultimate origin of matter is irrelevant because
we are not trying to do any such thing. We know that we can't, and
we do not even consider such a question as part of science.
We understand Hutton's wisdom. We do not search for unattainable ultimates. We define evolution, using Darwin's phrase, as
"descent with modification" from prior living things. Our documentation of life's evolutionary tree records one of science's greatest
triumphs, a profoundly liberating discovery on the oldest maxim
that truth can make us free. We have made this discovery by recognizing what can be answered and what must be left alone. If Justice
Scalia heeded our definitions and our practices, he would understand why creationism cannot qualify as science. He would also, by
the way, sense the excitement of evolution and its evidence; no per-
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son of substance could be unmoved by something so interesting.
Only Aristotle's creator may be so impassive.
Don Quixote recognized "no limits but the sky," but became
thereby the literary embodiment of unattainable reverie. G.K.
Chesterton understood that any discipline must define its borders of
fruitfulness. He spoke for painting, but you may substitute any creative enterprise: "Art is limitation: the essence of every picture is
the frame."

